Theeffectofeconomicinterdependenceontheonsetofmilitarizedconflictisatopic
of much interest among world politics researchers. Although some researchers continue to claim that trade may enhance the probability of war, most acknowledge that trade decreases the likelihood of militarized conflict. At least two notions motivate the hypothesized link between economic interdependence and militarized conflict. Some scholars argue that economic interdependence makes conflict too costly. Thus, states that are cognizant of the costs of a militarized clash choose to settle their differences short of the use of force. Others claim that economic interdependence decreases the probability of conflict by solving problems associated with asymmetric distributions of information. That is, in a bargaining context, the reservation values of states engaging in high levels of bilateral trade are more or less transparent. This allows differences to be settled peacefully, leading to more efficient transactions. Still others argue independently of the explanations based on costs or distributions of information. This line of research suggests that the observed pacifying effect of economic interdependence is nothing more than an artifact of unaccounted for time series dynamics. I argue that trade may enhance the probability that states settle their disagreements short of militarized conflict, because it serves to minimize distortion about the willingness of a target to give in to any specific demand issued by a dissatisfied challenger. It is important to note that this claim is only subtly different from the "conflict is too costly for trading states" notion. Because one of the parameters in the decision to use militarized force is the actors'utility for the costs of the conflict, the effect of costs is a crucial component in the "information" explanation. Although an increase in the costs of conflict for either actor will decrease the probability of conflict, my claim is that economic interdependence does not just result in increased costs. Rather, the effect of interdependence is most profound with respect to variation in the distribution of information about the costs of conflict and other crucial parameters in the actors' value functions. That is, trade affects the costs of conflict in two independent ways. First, the costs of conflict for trading states may be higher than for comparable nontrading states. Second, trading states have more precise information about their opponent's costs than do nontrading states. Although theoretically, these are different processes relating trade to conflict, the empirical implications of these independent effects are observationally equivalent. Trade should decrease the probability of conflict.
I construct a simple bargaining model to illustrate formally my argument. I evaluate the credibility of the formal model with a Bayesian heteroskedastic probit estimator. My results suggest that economic interdependence mitigates the effect of uncertainty, and this leads to an enhanced probability of settlement short of militarized conflict. I also show that trade is related to heterogeneity in conflict data. This heterogeneity is a possible explanation for the null findings in some of the published papers that examine the trade and conflict puzzle.
HETEROGENEITY AND CONFLICT ONSET
Previous empirical studies of international conflict model the onset of conflict using special cases of generalized linear models for indicator variables (Maoz and Russett 1993; Lemke and Reed 1996; Gartzke 1998; Oneal and Russett 1997; Beck, Katz, and Tucker 1998) . Unfortunately, these models are ill equipped to assess heterogeneity in conflict behavior that may be a function of economic interdependence and make it difficult to evaluate claims relating bilateral trade to distributions of information.
One weakness of previous empirical studies of conflict onset is their assumption that there is no observed heterogeneity in the conflict data. That is, all of the variation in conflict behavior is assumed to be only a function of ′ x i β. Not only is this an unrealistic practical assumption, it is also at odds with international relations theory. Standard empirical treatments pool together pairs of states as diverse as the United States and Canada or India and Pakistan and assume the variation in their conflict behavior is identical. Moreover, these models assume the variance in conflict behavior among Western European dyads is the same as among African dyads (Lemke 2002) . Not only does this seem unreasonable intuitively, but there are strong theoretical reasons to expect it is false. Bargaining models anticipate heterogeneous behavior as a function of asymmetric information and the variance in the distribution of types of defenders. If bargaining theory is credible, I expect the variance of the error in the challenger's estimate of the defender's type to vary with economic interdependence. As the challenger and defender trade less, the variance in the challenger's estimate of the defender's reservation value is greater. This leads to an enhanced probability of mistakes and a positive probability of conflict onset. A different specification is needed to address this deficiency in the standard models. To evaluate my claims about variance in the challenger's estimate of the defender's expected value for conflict, I incorporate heteroskedasticity in the probit model following a hierarchical specification. Reparameterizing the standard model to explicitly incorporate heterogeneity allows me to assess how variance in conflict behavior may be related to different levels of trade.
To manage the computational costs of evaluating the reparameterized probit likelihood function, I analyze the conflict data with Bayesian tools. Other Bayesian applications in political science include articles by Western and Jackman (1994) ; Western (1998) ; Schofield et al. (1998) , Quinn, Martin, and Whitford (1999) ; Smith (1999) ; King, Rosen, and Tanner (1999); and Jackman (2000b) . 1 The Bayesian approach assumes the data are fixed and the parameters of interest vary. The goal is to compute the probability density of the parameters of interest conditioned on the observed data. This probability density conditioned on the data is called the posterior. The posterior density summarizes the beliefs about the parameter of interest after observing the data. It is also necessary to specify formally beliefs about the parameter of interest before examining the data. Similar to the posterior, prior beliefs are expressed as a prior density. The parameter of interest is θ, and this parameter is assigned a prior π(θ). The prior summarizes the beliefs about θ before examining the data. The prior can be informed by theoretical expectations or by empirical patterns reported in past research. Although there are conventions for assigning priors, ultimately the information contained in the prior is left to the analyst. In this application, the parameter θ contains information about the relationship between economic interdependence and the emergence of conflict, and I assign diffuse priors to θ, such that the historical data dominate the priors. Using diffuse priors usually refers to the practice of specifying a prior distribution with wide variance. Uninformative priors are flat, and as the variance of the prior increases, diffuse priors approach uninformative priors. The model I use is xf (x|θ), where x are the data and f(•) is a generic response function. This model is proportional to the likelihood function summarizing the information about θ from the data, l(θ|x) ∝ f(x|θ). Using Bayes's theorem gives the posterior distribution for θ,
where π(θ|x) is the posterior density of θ. For this specific application, I use the following model:
where
I assign a subjective prior to β such that β~Normal(0, 10 4 ). That is, β is distributed normally with a mean of 0 and variance 10,000, and I assign a χ 2 (r)/r prior to the variances where r = 4. This prior is consistent with outliers and approximates the logit model. These priors are only marginally informative such that the data dominate the prior. By utilizing Bayesian simulation (Markov Chain Monte Carlo [MCMC]), I am able to make inferences based on the posterior.
I use the Gibbs sampler to obtain posterior samples. 2 However, obtaining samples directly from the posterior is difficult because of the presence of several integrals and the probit function Φ in the likelihood. To overcome these difficulties, I use the auxiliary variable technique of Albert and Chib (1993) .
3 This approach allows me to augment the observed data with a quantity Z. From both the observed data and Z, it is possible to calculate the posterior density. I augment the data by introducing auxiliary information z i where
Because the data are augmented with Z = (z 1 , z 2 , . . . ,z N ), the likelihood is equivalent to the standard linear model. As a result, this posterior is computationally manageable. I ran 25,000 Gibbs samples to recover the posterior densities with a burn in period of 10,000 samples. The Gibbs sampler begins with initial values (β 0 , v 0 , ε 0 , Z 0 ) and simulates the posteriors π (β|v, ε, Z, y), π(v|β, ε, Z, y), π(ε|Z, v, β, y) , and π (Z|β, ε, v, y) . 4 The general idea behind the estimation is to use the conflict data to find reasonable starting values for the parameters. Next, these parameters are used to estimate the latent variable Z. Then the latent variable is used to estimate the parameters, and this is repeated. This approach is useful for my problem because it provides me with a posterior for the variance of each observation in the data file. The mean of these posterior densities can be plotted to explore visually the relationship between variance and economic interdependence. Standard approaches simply assume the variance is constant and make such exploratory analysis difficult.
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2. See Jackman (2000a) for a discussion of the Gibbs sampler in a political science context. A more general discussion may be found in Carlin and Lewis (1996) and Gelman et al. (1995) .
3. For an alternate approach to modeling heterogeneity in the context of a probit regression, see Alvarez and Brehm (1995) .
4. See Smith (1999) for a discussion of estimating the posterior though data augmentation in the context of crisis escalation.
TRADE AND CONFLICT
Returning to the substantive problem, the relationship between the onset of militarized conflict and economic interdependence is an important area in which research on international bargaining may offer novel insights. This is an especially fertile area of research because of the lively scholarly debate about the effect of economic interdependence on the onset of militarized conflict. Working within the liberal peace research program, John Oneal and Bruce Russett (1997 Russett ( , 1999a Russett ( , 1999b Russett ( , 1999c Russett ( , 2001 have published several papers supporting the contention that trade promotes peace or at least has a robust pacifying effect on the onset of militarized conflict. Moreover, Oneal and Russett argue that the pacifying effect of economic interdependence holds important clues about the observed peace between and among democratic states. Democracy may reduce the probability of militarized conflict by indirectly increasing the amount of economic interdependence (Russett and Oneal 2001) . In related work, Lisa Martin (2000) asserts that democratic states may be better equipped to foster economic interdependence because they are better able to make credible commitments with respect to the terms of trade. In sum, economic interdependence allows for more efficient bargaining.
Similar lines of inquiry claim that increased contact in the form of economic exchange between states can decrease the probability of conflict. For example, Deutsch et al. (1957) argue that trade can lead to the development of a sense of community, and this shared community may make conflict less likely. Moreover, Polachek, Robst, and Chang (1999) claim that because states know conflict will distort the benefits from trade, trade deters militarized conflict. Put simply, the costs of conflict are higher for trading states, and with greater costs, the expected value for militarized conflict is lower. Thus, ceteris paribus, trading states can expect to gain less from a militarized clash than would nontrading states and, as a result, are more likely to accept a bargained outcome short of militarized conflict. Yet it is also theoretically possible that interdependence may enhance the probability of militarized conflict. With the prospect for economic gains from trade comes the possibility that failure to agree on the terms of trade may result in the escalation of hostility. Therefore, depending on the context of the transactions between states, interdependence provides an opportunity for conflict that might not exist in the absence of international exchanges of goods and services. Stated more formally, as the stakes of a militarized conflict increase, states' expected value for conflict increases. This makes a bargained outcome appear less attractive and enhances the probability of conflict.
Contributing to the richness of this research area, several sophisticated econometric analyses of the relationship between trade and conflict have been conducted. Unfortunately, the results from these studies contradict each other. Much of the inconsistency is attributable to the use of varied temporal domains, different statistical estimators, and alternate measures of economic interdependence. The discrepancies are most apparent in the work of Barbieri and Schneider (1999) versus Oneal and Russett (1997) . Whereas Barbieri and Schneider find that economic interdependence actually enhances the probability of disputes and wars, Oneal and Russett report economic interdependence decreases the likelihood of disputes. Barbieri and Schneider claim 58 JOURNAL OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION that economic interdependence increases the stakes of conflict, and as the stakes of the conflict increase, so do states' expected values for conflict. This makes conflict appear more attractive when compared to a bargained outcome. It also should be noted the consistency of the statistical results have been somewhat qualified by Beck, Katz, and Tucker (1998) . Specifically, Beck, Katz, and Tucker argue that trade has little effect on the probability of militarized conflict once temporal dynamics are taken into account.
BARGAINING AND CONFLICT
The literature on bargaining and its various applications to the study of world politics has profoundly affected the scientific study of international interactions. Bargaining models are being used to better understand the onset of militarized conflict, the process of conflict within a war, and the outcomes of war.
5 This approach has also been used to better explain the relationship between trade and conflict (Gartzke, Li, and Boehmer 2001) . I build on this important research by studying the effect of economic interdependence on the probability of militarized conflict in the context of the bargaining framework. I use a simple bargaining model to evaluate the relationship between the distribution of information, economic interdependence, and the onset of militarized conflict (see Figure 1 ). I show how interdependence might decrease the probability of conflict by increasing the costs of conflict (Oneal and Russett 1997) . I also illustrate how interdependence can enhance the probability of conflict as it increases the stakes of the contest (Barbieri and Schneider 1999) . Moreover, to the extent that these two effects are working against each other, null findings are anticipated by the bargaining model. Finally, I show how economic interdependence might decrease uncertainty, lowering the likelihood of conflict. Thus, all of the notions that relate interdependence to the onset of conflict can be represented in this overly simple formalization.
Restating my argument more formally, consider two risk-neutral actors with linear utility functions where a status quo challenger makes a demand, x, and the defender chooses to accept or reject the demand. If the defender accepts the challenger's offer, the challenger receives x and -x goes to the defender. If the defender rejects the challenger's offer, conflict with stakes π occurs. In the event of such a conflict, the challenger prevails with some likelihood, p, and pays a cost of c C . Thus, the challenger's expected value for conflict is pπ -c C , whereas the defender's expected value is -pπ -c D . Because the challenger and defender would prefer to forgo the costs of conflict, c i , the challenger selects a demand to make the defender indifferent between the utility for the challenger's demand and the expected value for militarized conflict. Setting -x equal to -pπ -c D and solving for the optimal demand yields x* = pπ + c D . Thus, when the challenger and defender know each other's payoffs, and conflict is costly, the probability of conflict is zero. They are always able to settle on a bargain short of militarized conflict, avoiding the costs of such a contest. 6 
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5. For a review of this emerging literature, see Reiter (2001) .
Yet it seems more reasonable and is critical to my argument to assume the challenger is uncertain about the optimal offer (x* from above). I incorporate uncertainty into the challenger's decision by assuming the defender's expected value for conflict, as observed by the challenger, has some error, ε.
7 I assume the error is known by the defender but the challenger knows only the distribution from which ε is drawn. Thus, the defender's expected value for war is -pπ -c D + ε. In this application, the probability of conflict is Pr(x > pπ + c D -ε), and solving in terms of the error gives Pr(ε > -x + pπ + c D ). This splits the population of defenders into two types. Those defenders with ε ≤ -x + pπ + c D give in to the challenger's demand, whereas defenders with ε > -x + pπ + c D reject the demand in favor of a militarized clash. If the challenger underestimates the defender's expected value for conflict, it assumes that the defender is a low type ε. If the defender is actually a high type ε, conflict occurs. Because the cumulative distribution function (CDF) can be used to express the probability of a variable being less than or equal to some value, the probability of conflict is Pr(
Because the challenger is uncertain about the defender's type, it is faced with a riskreturn trade-off. The larger the demand, the greater the potential payoff. However, at the same time, the larger the demand, the greater the probability of conflict. The size of the demand is related to the probability of conflict because increasing demands raise the cut point, dividing defenders who prefer to fight and defenders who prefer to concede to the challenger's demand. 8 Formally, the challenger's expected value for a demand x is
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Figure 1: A Simple Bargaining Game
6. This result is consistent with several applications of the bargaining model that suggest uncertainty is a necessary condition for the onset of conflict. For a general discussion of the implications of this model, see Fearon (1995) .
7. Although most applications assume an asymmetric distribution of information, two-sided uncertainty is perhaps more realistic. However, such a model would make the empirical analysis that follows impossible. Therefore, I limit my formalization to asymmetric information.
The first expression in equation (5) is the product of the probability the defender fights and the challenger's expected value for conflict. The second expression in equation (5) is the product of the probability the defender accepts the challenger's demand and the magnitude of the demand. The challenger's problem is to maximize equation (5) with respect to x. Solving this problem is straightforward:
The second order condition is
The optimal demand, x*, solves the first order condition (6) subject to the second order condition (7).
COMPARATIVE STATICS
The model suggests some sharp expectations about the relationship between costs, stakes, uncertainty, and the likelihood of militarized conflict. Specifically, the following implications are deduced from the model:
Proposition 1: A marginal increase in either the defender's or challenger's costs of conflict will decrease the probability of conflict. This is shown by differentiating the first order condition (6) and noting that marginal increases in the defender's or challenger's costs of conflict have a negative effect on the probability of conflict. Because the costs of conflict affect how the challenger and defender view their expected values for conflict, as the costs increase, the expected value for conflict decreases, when compared to the utility for a bargained outcome. As a result, increases in the costs enhance the chances that the defender will accept the challenger's demand in favor of a militarized clash and also decrease the size of the challenger's demand. This static is consistent with the claims of Oneal and Russett (1997) and generally supports the liberal position that relates trade to costs and subsequently less conflict.
Proposition 2: A marginal increase in the stakes of the conflict will increase the probability of conflict. This is shown by differentiating the first order condition (6) and noting that a marginal increase in the stakes of conflict has a positive effect on the probability of conflict. Because the stakes of the conflict affect how the challenger and defender view their expected return from a militarized clash, as the stakes increase, the states' expected values for conflict increase, making a bargained outcome less attractive.
This static is consistent with the claims of Barbieri and Schneider (1999) and generally supports the notion that if interdependence increases the stakes of a conflict, it will subsequently enhance the probability of a militarized clash. Moreover, it makes clear how the claims of Oneal and Russett (1997) and Barbieri and Schneider are logically consistent but likely work against each other in standard empirical tests of the trade conflict puzzle.
VARIANCE IN DEFENDER TYPES AND CONFLICT
Most relevant for this study is the question of how changes in the variance of the distribution of types of defenders affect the probability of conflict.
9 Specifically, consider the effect of expanding or contracting the range of ε without changing the mean. Substantively, this amounts to increasing the noise in the challenger's choice of the optimal demand, which is equivalent to expanding the variance of ε. As the variance in the distribution of types of defenders expands, it is increasingly difficult for the challenger to differentiate between defenders of low type ε from defenders of high type ε. What effect does the variance in distribution of defender types have on the probability of conflict? To assess the effect of incremental changes in the variance of the distribution of types of defenders on the likelihood of conflict, I denote µ to be the mean of the distribution f(•) and assume ε is distributed in the interval [µ -σ(µ -a), µ + σ(b -µ)], where 0 < a < b < 1, with a probability density function (PDF) h(•) and a CDF H(•) defined by
and
Using different values for σ gives a family of distributions all with the same mean but with different higher moments. This allows me to assess the impact of variance in the distribution of ε on the probability of conflict.
(•) is an expanded version of f(•); and for σ < 1, h(•) is a contracted version of f(•). A third proposition follows.
Proposition 3: An expansion of the range of ε will increase the probability of conflict.
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9. Schultz (1999, 245 ) makes a similar argument about the relationship between variance in information and its relationship to domestic political institutions.
Increasing the variance in the distribution of types of defenders enhances the likelihood of conflict because it increases the differences among types in the expected outcome of conflict. This static is consistent with those presented in Wittman (2001) and Bebchuk (1984) . This result can be confirmed by rearranging equation (6) into the hazard rate. Manipulating the first order condition gives the hazard rate
Substituting the expanded distribution H and h for F and f gives
The proposition is proved by differentiating the first order condition, using h and H instead of f and F, and noting that marginal increases in σ have a positive effect on the probability of conflict.
To interpret the relationship between economic interdependence and the emergence of militarized conflict, it is important to consider how trade might be related to the variance in ε. It seems reasonable to expect high levels of economic interdependence to be associated with an enhanced likelihood that trading states can better estimate each other's reservation value. This is consistent, for example, with the claims made by Deutsch et al. (1957) discussed earlier. As states are more engaged economically with each other, the variance in the noise parameter can be expected to shrink. Likewise, pairs of states that do not trade are likely to be more uncertain about their respective reservation values, and the range of ε can be expected to expand. It also seems reasonable to expect the relationship between trade and uncertainty to be nonlinear where the informational returns from trade are marginally decreasing.
Following Wittman (2001) , I formally incorporate this dynamic into the bargaining model by assuming σ is a function of the level of economic interdependence. As pairs of states trade less, σ increases, leading to greater uncertainty. Likewise, as trade increases between two states, σ approaches zero, and the variance in the distribution of types of defenders shrinks. Thus, ceteris paribus, I expect the probability of conflict emergence to be greatest when there is little or no trade because of the negative relationship between economic interdependence and variance in the distribution of types of defenders.
Hypothesis 1: Economic interdependence is negatively correlated with the variance or uncertainty about the defender's reservation point. Hypothesis 2: Increases in variance or uncertainty about the defender's reservation point enhance the probability of militarized conflict.
previous research, I use data from Oneal and Russett (1997) to evaluate the credibility of these hypotheses. These data consist of observations on 20,990 pairs of states over the time period between 1950 and 1985. The unit of analysis is the dyad year, and the data contain information on 827 politically relevant dyads. Each dyad is observed once for every year it appears in the data file. The dependent variable is the existence of a militarized dispute. The coding of this dependent variable and the collection of the militarized interstate dispute date are discussed in Jones, Bremer, and Singer (1996) . The crucial independent variable for this research is economic interdependence, as indexed by Oneal and Russett. This variable increases as there is greater economic interdependence between two states. Thus, drawing on past research and the logic of the bargaining model, I expect the average effect of this variable to be negatively related to militarized conflict. Measures of joint democracy, the distribution of capabilities, alliance membership, and territorial contiguity are included as controls. The measurement of these control variables is discussed in Oneal and Russett and in Beck, Katz, and Tucker (1998) . I also include a spline to correct for temporal dependence existing in the data, following Beck, Katz, and Tucker.
STATISTICAL ANALYSIS
The formal model suggests that the defender rejects the challenger's offer if ε is greater than pπ -x + c D . Therefore, the probability of militarized conflict is Pr(ε ≤ -pπ + x -c D ). Assuming that proxy measures can be found for the variables, it is possible to rewrite the probability of conflict in statistical terms as a probit with the form Φ(-pπ + x -c D ) ≡ Φ(x′β). Using the standard normal cumulative distribution function to express the probability of ε being less than or equal to x′β, the probit model is derived from the bargaining model. This is simply the ε distribution evaluated at x′β. This of course assumes ε is exogenous and symmetric. However, because the bargaining model suggests ε is endogenous and says little about the shape of its distribution, the probit model is only loosely derived from bargaining theory. I explore the endogeneity problem elsewhere (Reed and Hwang 2002) . Although past research does not provide an explicit formal justification for the statistical model, this is essentially the statistical model used in the published studies that analyze the effect of interdependence on conflict onset.
To evaluate the credibility of the bargaining model, I assess the relationship between economic interdependence and the variance in the distribution of types of defenders. Essentially, the goal of the statistical analysis is to estimate the relationship between economic interdependence and σ from equations (8) and (9) and is central to evaluating the first hypothesis.
INTERPRETATION
My hypotheses deduced from bargaining theory anticipate the variance in the distribution of types of defenders to be greatest at low levels of economic interdepen-
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dence, and this increased variance enhances the likelihood of a militarized clash. Therefore, the presence of heteroskedastic errors related to different levels of economic interdependence would be consistent with the expectations deduced from bargaining theory and would provide some support for my hypotheses and the bargaining model. Thus, if I discover evidence of heteroskedastic errors related to different levels of trade, the first hypothesis is deemed plausible. An observed relationship between interdependence and militarized conflict would suggest the second hypothesis is credible.
Results from the estimation are presented in Figure 2 and Table 1 . I plot the means of the posterior densities of the variance parameters against the economic interdependence variable in Figure 2 . The mean of the posterior density for β is reported in the first column of Table 1 .
These mean values are comparable to conventional maximum likelihood estimates and are consistent with previous research (Oneal and Russett 1997; Beck, Katz, and Tucker 1998) . I report the results from a standard maximum likelihood probit model in the third column of Table 1 for comparison. Inspection shows the maximum likelihood estimates and the means of the posterior distributions are similar. Past research that reports a negative relationship between economic interdependence and militarized conflict is confirmed. The mean of the posterior density of the trade variable is negative. As states trade more, the probability of militarized conflict decreases. The effects of the control variables are also consistent with the empirical patterns reported in the literature. Jointly democratic dyads are less likely to experience militarized conflict; states that share a border are more likely to fight; states sharing an alliance, experiencing economic growth, and with a relatively unequal balance of military capabilities are less likely to engage in conflict. These results are also consistent with the comparative statics from the bargaining model with respect to the costs of conflict on the probability of a militarized clash. Liberal variables associated with costs, such as joint democracy and trade, pacify conflict.
I refer to Figure 2 to evaluate the credibility of my first hypothesis about the relationship between variance in the distribution of types of defenders and the level of economic interdependence. I plot the means of the posterior samples of v i against different distributions of trade to assess the possibility that the posterior means of v i are a function of economic interdependence. The assumption of constant variance in the errors and independence between the error and the explanatory variables can be evaluated visually. The formalization suggests variance will increase as states trade less, and increases in the variance will be associated with the onset of militarized conflict. Following past research that equates increasing uncertainty with greater error variance (Downs and Rocke 1979; Alvarez and Brehm 1995) , the relationship between trade and variance in the distribution of types of defenders is informative. The figure shows the plot of the mean of the posterior densities of the variances against the trade variable. Each plotted point is the mean of the draws from the posterior distribution of v i . As pairs of states trade less, variance in the distribution of types of defenders and its proxy, the mean of the posterior distributions for the variances, increase in magnitude. These results suggest there is a great deal of volatility in the model as trade approaches zero and that a strong positive correlation exists between less trade and greater variance in the distribution of types of defenders. This illustration provides support for the first hypothesis. There appears to be a link between variance in the distribution of types of defenders and trade. It is also important to note that the mean of the posterior distributions for the variances appears to come from a mixture distribution. One distribution has a mean of approximately 1.8, whereas the other distribution has a mean around 1.35. An important next step in this research will involve constructing an empirical model that not only incorporates the heterogeneity associated with economic interdependence but also accounts for the mixture in the distribution.
Because uncertainty formally results in a nonzero probability of conflict, conceptualizing uncertainty or asymmetric information as a relevant variable that is excluded from the empirical model suggests excluded variable bias. Earlier work by Morrow (1989) points to this problem, which is confirmed by Clark and Nordstom (2001) , who suggest a similar interpretation of the effect of uncertainty on the significance of empirical research that relies on the relationship between the distribution of power, regime type, and conflict onset. The same logic holds here. If uncertainty is correlated with trade, it is difficult to make a precise estimate of the effect of interdependence on conflict onset without first partialing out the effect of uncertainty. As a result, past research that reports a weak pacifying effect of interdependence is qualified, and to get a reasonable estimate of the effect of interdependence on conflict emergence, it is necessary to model this heterogeneity that is assumed away by the standard treatments.
Figure 2: Trade and Information
Not only is there a significant amount of unexplained heterogeneity in the data, the heterogeneity is correlated with the level of trade. This result demonstrates that the homogeneity assumption made by international relations researchers using traditional logit or probit model is unrealistic. Because maximum likelihood estimators are known to be inconsistent and the covariance matrix may be incorrect (Yatchew and Griliches 1985) when the variance of the errors is heteroskedastic, the implications of this analysis are quite broad. Specifically, research that does not address the relationship between the variance in the error and economic interdependence may be incorrect. Although I demonstrate a potential source of the heterogeneity, a much richer model is needed to correct for the heterogeneity. Additionally, my results provide support for formal bargaining models of international interactions. Increases in the variance of the distribution of types of defenders appear to exhibit the expected effect of creating the conditions for bargaining to break down, leading to the use of force to dictate the bargains.
CONCLUSION
My results suggest that a focus on traditional world politics explanatory variables alone is insufficient. Instead, the distribution of information and its relationship to the standard explanatory variables is a potentially important determinant of international interactions. I illustrate the effect of information formally and provide a rational explanation for the relationship between economic interdependence and militarized conflict. Bargaining models suggest that if the absence of trade is associated with greater variance in the distribution of types of defenders, the probability of conflict is greatest between states with low levels of economic interdependence. The hypothesized link between uncertainty and economic interdependence is corroborated with historical data analysis, which illustrates a correlation between the level of trade and uncertainty. This suggests that as states become less economically dependent on each other, uncertainty about their opponent's type is greatest. I argue that because uncertainty is necessary for conflict, this covariation at least partially explains the observed relationship between economic interdependence and the onset of militarized conflict. These findings offer important clues about the credibility of bargaining models of international politics. The results I report provide tentative, but encouraging, support for the use of a bargaining framework to understand international interactions. My argument and results are consistent with others who utilize a bargaining framework and suggest a much richer relationship between economic interdependence and the probability of militarized conflict. Specifically, I find that asymmetric information and greater variance in the distribution of types of defenders is related to trade, and I claim that the often debated relationship between trade and militarized conflict may, at least to some extent, be an artifact of the relationship between economic interdependence and the distribution of information.
Furthermore, I show the logit and probit models frequently employed by international politics researchers may yield inconsistent parameter estimates as a result of the heterogeneity present in international relations data, and I offer a Bayesian alternative to the standard empirical models. Evidence is rapidly mounting to suggest heterogeneous data are the norm in international politics (Clark and Nordstrom 2002; BoxSteffensmeier and Zorn 2001; Lemke 2002) . As a result, it is essential for future research to recognize the threat that such heterogeneity poses for inferences about international interactions. However, this study is not without its weaknesses. It is difficult to make a very sharp inference about the relationship between the variance in the model and economic interdependence with the simple graphical illustration I present. Moreover, the statistical model is likely overparameterized and is only identified because of the priors. An important next step in this line of inquiry is to partition out the variance in militarized conflict that is explained by information effects from the effect of economic interdependence. This can be accomplished within the Bayesian framework and avoids the potential problem of overparameterization.
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10. For an example of this approach to a similar problem, see Gill and Meier (2002) .
